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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP**  
**INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

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COUNTRY *Paraguay*

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This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1973 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States.

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SUPPLEMENT

ORIGIN  
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There follows in its entirety a copy of the clandestinely published "Internal Bulletin No. 2" issued by the National Directorate of the Communist Party of Paraguay. This document, because of the self-criticism of the organization contained in it, is unusually revealing as to the state of the affairs and activities of the Communist Party of Paraguay. In the paragraphs which follow, members of the Party are criticized for failure to execute all plans for sabotage and armed aid to the Paraguayan Navy in the uprising of 27-30 April last. The part which Communists can still play in aiding the Paraguayan rebels is outlined; comments upon the reorganization of the Party are presented; and detailed advice on how to combat panic and avoid the police is presented to Party members.

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NO CHANGE in Class. ☐

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INTERNAL BULLETIN NO. 2

94363

(May 1947)

(Published by the National Directorate)

THE RESISTANCE OF THE NAVYCONFIDENTIAL

Since the beginning of the democratic Revolution of Concepcion the dictatorship has been trying to destroy the National Navy because it knew of its sympathies for the Revolution. This danger gave rise to a logical resistance movement within the Navy.

Our Party believed that the Navy should not be precipitated into an isolated fight against an enemy who was superior in number and in arms, but that the Navy's fight should be combined with the offensive of the Liberating Army of the North and with a popular uprising.

We attempted to postpone the armed clash as much as possible. But the resistance movement within the Navy soon became very intense, taking in even non-commissioned officers and sailors, who were exerting pressure from below. Under these circumstances, the National Directorate of the Party foresaw that the armed clash was imminent and resolved that the Party should participate in the fight in order to give its support to the workers and instill in them the proper action and orientation and a firm revolutionary impulse, with a view to overthrowing the enemy forces in the Capital (and then organizing the resistance in the Capital).

The Party Directorate was influential in the formation of a unified civilian-military directorate. But before this could be accomplished the military directorate was dissolved, as a result of the enemy's surprise blow and, from that moment (Saturday the 26th) the movement had no leadership or directorate.

This was the principal cause for its defeat.

We will say nothing here about the development of the fighting because our May manifesto is sufficiently instructive in this respect.

The masses of our Party in the Navy zone answered the slogan emitted by the Party with magnificent combative pressure. The Communists have again become prominent as the most combative and firm force in the fight for democracy and for the progressive development of the land.

Eternal glory to those affiliates and sympathizers who fell in the heroic three-day resistance.

OUR FAULTS

Our Party's reaction made itself felt very weakly in the zones dominated by the enemy. The railroad was not stopped. The enemy's communications were not sabotaged. The line of tactics (presented in numerous documents or instructions) of harassing the enemy through the rear guard by means of guerrilla tactics was not carried out. There was no contact or joint action with Febreristas and Liberals, who also remained passive.

Nevertheless, during the three days of armed fighting it would have been easy to go out and operate, since the Police were busy in the armed fight and, to a certain extent, unable to act.

We must know the causes of these serious errors so that they may not be repeated at future times of crisis and fighting, which are now approaching.

It is necessary for the zone directorates and base groups (groups at neighborhoods, shops and places of work) meet to discuss why they did not fulfill their mission during the three days of fighting.

Did they receive, either in writing or verbally, the instruction from the Party Directorate to prepare themselves immediately to take part in the armed uprising?

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Were they acquainted with the instruction (now old) to support the armed uprising by means of a general strike, by means of sabotage against the enemy's communications and surprise attacks on enemy detachments?

If there was disorientation, hesitation, lack of initiative, what were the causes for these weaknesses?

What practical measures (educational and organizational) should be adopted in each zone, shop, place of work or neighborhood so that this should not occur again in some new crisis?

We suggest that the comrades open a sincere and profound discussion of these questions, and that they communicate their opinions to the Party Directorate. (They should not be afraid or reserved in pointing out the errors or weaknesses of the leaders, if any.)

#### PRESENT SITUATION

As indicated in the manifesto just issued by our Party, the dictatorship has not succeeded in consolidating itself by its aggression against the Navy, as MORINIGO and his servants had expected. The dictatorship has demonstrated its military weakness in this three-day fight against small isolated groups of sailors and patriots who were without leadership and organization. The revolt of the gunboats has inflicted a counter-blow, both material and moral, against the dictatorship, as has the conquest of Colonia Nueva Germania by the Liberating Army of the North. We are in the third month of the Revolution and the dictatorship does not feel strong enough to take the offensive. The resignation of Colonel SMITH has weakened the authority of the Government's forces. The first guerrillas have appeared in the campaign. The people are strengthening their fighting spirit.

Nevertheless, the fight will be very hard. Great efforts and great sacrifices will be necessary in order to defeat the dictatorship. The enemy is still strong, and hopes to win time to strengthen itself with the arrival of the airplanes, tanks, etc., that it has bought in the United States, Belgium, Argentina, Brazil, etc. Therefore, it is necessary for all the forces of the Revolution, those at the front in Concepcion as well as those at the enemy's rear guard (particularly in the Capital) to intensify their activities to defeat the enemy in the shortest time possible.

#### PRESENT WORK OF THE COMMUNISTS

In the new situation subsequent to the liquidation of the Navy there does not exist any condition for a successful uprising which is not linked to the action of the Liberating Army of the North - but there do exist favorable conditions for aiding the victory of the Revolution in a practical and effective form through sabotage, guerrilla fighting, etc., and for preparing (by means of immediate partial fights) for a decisive action in conjunction with the offensive of the Liberating Army of the North.

Therefore, the zone directorates (and all affiliates) should concentrate their attention and their activity on these immediate jobs:

1. Plan and organize acts of sabotage against determined vital points in the dictatorship's military organization or preparation: transportation, communications, depots, etc. Each zone should elaborate a plan. (Those zones in whose radius there are no important objectives to destroy should cooperate with other zones). This is our principal job for now.
2. Carry out a broad work of political clarification through personal explanations and printed propaganda among the working and popular masses, for the purpose of raising still higher their fighting spirit and the revolutionary decision of the people and attracting numerous patriots (particularly young people)

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to practical action against the dictatorship.

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3. Carry out actions against determined arms depots or enemy detachments with a view to obtaining arms.

4. Form action (or shock) groups at each place of work and in each neighborhood, with affiliates and citizens of other Parties, or without Parties, for the carrying out of sabotage, etc. Form citizens' auxiliary committees (women included) to raise money and material for the action of these action groups.

5. Organize the families of prisoners (of all parties) into Committees for Aid to Prisoners which will be in charge of denouncing tortures and assassinations, collecting money, provisions and medicines, etc.

6. Unite the workers at their places of work (into factory or shop committees), establish permanent liaison with the Febrerista and Liberal groups in all zones of the capital and in the country, and reach concrete agreements with them for joint action.

#### WE MUST REORGANIZE THE PARTY

To carry out these jobs successfully, it is necessary for the zone directorates and the Party Groups (groups at shops or places of work and neighborhood groups) to function regularly, to meet periodically (short meetings of three people), to broaden their contacts with the masses and to work with a clear understanding of the present situation, of the Party's mission and of the concrete jobs of the respective organization.

This is not done in practice. Our Party is largely disorganized and insufficiently linked to the masses. The causes for this are the following:

1. The blows (arrest of officers and active members) which the Party has suffered since January.
2. The difficulties faced by Party work.
3. The fear (and desertion abroad) of some hesitant Party elements.
4. The defective method of directing consists of trying to direct groups and affiliates by means of notes (with no political content) and orders, without assuming the task of cultivating officers and active members through active and continuous contact and thoroughly and concretely explaining to them the mission, the political line and line of tactics and the political job of the Party on a national scale and in each zone, factory, shop or neighborhood.

We must initiate a reaction against these errors, an ideological and political fight of an educational nature within our Party.

We are going to strengthen the zone directorates in accordance with what the Party has been agreed upon since January. In this manner we will bring the Party Directorate closer to its base.

The zone directorates should base their work of directing on politically arming the leaders and active members of the groups at places of work and in neighborhoods, as well as the heads of the shock groups. For this purpose they should converse periodically with them, extensively, calmly and fraternally, and find out how they are applying the Party line, what results they have obtained and what difficulties they are encountering in the fulfillment of the work, and help them with explanations and advice.

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The Party groups (groups at places of work and in neighborhoods) should leave their isolation and increase their work with the masses, explaining to them the necessity for intensifying the fight to finish the dictatorship, persecution and hunger. They should encourage their members to speak to and win over their

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working colleagues and neighbors to form action groups and to perform acts of sabotage against the enemy. They should establish and strengthen relations with Febrerista and Liberal groups or militants in their neighborhoods or factories, and form, with them, concrete plans for joint action.

# SOME ADVICE FOR ILLEGAL WORK

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The persecution is great, but it is not so rigorous that it does not permit Party officers and affiliates to move and act. The great majority of our imprisoned comrades have been arrested because of indiscretions they committed. Care or precautions should be taken. Know all your neighbors in order to be able to pick out possible informers. Lead a normal life, avoid all appearances of being persecuted. Do not have many visitors at your house. Leave at fixed hours. Always check street corners and always notice whether someone is following you on the street. Do not go to suspected or dangerous houses. Organize a group of collaborators, men and women, for liaison and to find houses to hide in. If you are very well known in one section, move to another one. If you are too well known in the city, ask the Party for a transfer to the country to form guerrillas. Above all, do not speak about the Party's internal affairs. Make trustworthy friends at your place of work and in your neighborhood in order to transmit to them Party directives and, through them, to make them reach the masses.

If these rules are applied, it is improbable that the enemy will be able to locate our officers and affiliates.

# WE MUST COMBAT PANIC

The Party Directorate has received an extensive report from our comrades in Concepcion.

It says that the Liberating Army is increasing its power and its fighting spirit day by day, at the same time that it is consolidating the rear guard and the economy of the Revolution.

The people and the Army of the North are firmly convinced that victory will be democracy's, although they well understand that a very bitter fight and very great efforts will be necessary to win it.

It is the duty of every patriot and democrat - above all, of the Communists - to redouble his activity to help practically in the conquest of Victory.

All the forces and energy of the people, without distinction as to political party, must march toward the defeat and crushing of the enemy in the shortest time possible. No one must remain inactive. Victory demands the contributions of everyone and of each one. Knowing how to profit by the desire to help, which is alive in many patriots, men and women, depends upon the Communists.

The Communist, no matter where he lives, works or acts, should fight against panic, demoralization and desertion in any form. He should firmly combat the tendency of certain hesitant affiliates to take asylum or escape abroad. Such conduct is unworthy of a Communist.

With profound confidence in the immense revolutionary energy of the Paraguayan people, the Communist will rationally stimulate the fighting spirit of his working colleagues and his neighbors. He will unite them and group them for the fight. He will orientate and educate them politically and will lead them in combat without noticing any sacrifice, no matter how great it may be.

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